

10-3581

11 May 1958

Hon. Stanley K. Hornbeck

STATOTHR

Dear Stanley:

Many thanks for sending me a copy of your article, "Communism at Work in China" which appeared in the spring issue of World Affairs.

I appreciate your thinking of me and read the article with a great deal of interest.

Faithfully,

SIGNED

Allen W. Dulles
Director

STATINTL

O/DCI, [redacted] JNF 9 May 58

Dist:

Orig - Add.

1 - DCI

1 - ER v/basic.

1 - FMC via READING

2015 02 01 20

Communism at Work in China

Too many people believe and many too many are told that what has happened to and in China since VJ Day has been and is acceptable to the Chinese people because it is in keeping with their history and their traditions.

As a matter of simple fact, the Chinese are a people who, when "Communism" descended upon them, had no history, no tradition and no living experience of anything comparable to or resembling the totalitarian system which in and since that year the Communist Party in China and the government which that Party created have imposed upon them.

The Communist Party in China had grown from seeds imported from Moscow in 1920. It had attempted in 1927 to seize control of the Nationalist movement. Thwarted in that effort, it thereafter had operated for twenty years as an armed and militant opposition. Finally, after VJ Day, with Soviet moral and physical support, it defeated the National Government in battle after battle, and, in 1949, it set up, in Peking (Peiping), a new government, the "Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China."

China was at that moment a Land that had been ravaged by warfare during most of more than 20 years. Its economy was in ruins. Its government was overburdened and weary. Most of its people and most of its foreign residents and their affiliates were ready to welcome anything in the guise or the form of a "new deal." And that was what the Communists—blaming for the ills that prevailed, first the Nationalists, second the Japanese, and finally all of the foreign powers *except the Soviet Union* and its satellites—promised: a new deal, a great new deal, Utopia.

What then was Communism? Well, whatever may have been the concepts and intentions of the founders, Communism had become by 1949 a *device* for despotism, a system powered by and radiating an ideology, an instrument employed and adapted, in each of many countries, by a few leaders and a small percentage of the local population—for acquisition and exercise of political control. Incidentally, Yalta had contributed to its having become that.

The first conspicuous and unmistakable result of the Communist victory in China was the retreat of the National Government to the island province, Taiwan (Formosa), and the beginning of the new phase which, although China, the country, remains China there are *in* China two governments each exercising authority over a part of the country and each claiming to be the government of the whole.

BY STANLEY K. HORNBECK

United States Ambassador, Retired

The government on the mainland, i.e. the Communist regime, has since 1949 made effective its jurisdiction over all parts—except only Outer Mongolia and Formosa—of what had been in the days of the Manchus the Chinese Empire; and it has given this domain the first truly totalitarian organization and administration that the peoples within its boundaries ever have known.

In the course of eight years plus, it has made of its domain a Land wherein the central authorities make decisions which, implemented by a huge bureaucracy, directly affect *almost every aspect* of the life and livelihood of the people—men, women and children, individually and collectively. With an elaborate system of physical and psychological controls, the Party and the Government exalt the "state", preach "Communism", tolerate no opposition or dissent, and prepare the nation for what they call a "Socialist" order.

At the outset—while establishing order, the new rulers for some time showed respect for principles and procedures of justice. But once they were well in control they caused all agencies, including the courts, to function as instruments of state policy.

To cause the nation to accept an authoritarian and totalitarian regime, the Party and the Government set out to impose their own version of the Soviet version of "Communism." So they have made war—hot and cold—upon the old culture and its manifestations. In that process, they have done their utmost to extirpate all religions and all creeds—except the creed which they themselves preach. They have persecuted priests and teachers. They have expelled or imprisoned missionaries and foreign business men. They have forced the closing of foreign diplomatic and related establishments. They have burned and censored books. They have liquidated millions of their own people. They have enslaved many other millions. And, right and left and up and down, they have confiscated the properties of their victims.

Early and conspicuous was their carrying out of "agrarian reform." First, landlords were denounced. Next they were turned over to the populace for trial and execution. Then their lands were divided among the peasants. Next the peasants were taxed, and they soon found the taxes more of a burden than had been the rentals which they had paid before—whereas from the paying of the taxes there was and is no way of escape. In that context, and in

Reprinted from the Spring 1958 issue of WORLD AFFAIRS

others, the regime has demonstrated strikingly that power to tax can indeed be power to destroy.

While destroying, the new rulers have also created. One of their first constructive achievements was that of establishing a stable currency. Early, too, was their enactment of a new Marriage Law—which greatly improved the legal status of women but was very damaging, as it was intended to be, to the old social order.

They have emphasized education—Communist education. Schools, faculties, students, text books and their authors and their publishers—all—they have brought under government control. They have made Russian a second language. They employ Russians—some—as instructors in many of the universities. They feature, as do the Russians, *technical studies*.

In place of the old books, they have published and distributed more newly printed matter—officially approved, of course—than had ever before been circulated in China. Toward teaching, informing and propagandizing *all*, and for the illiterate in particular, official agencies turn out radio material, place loudspeakers on the streets, and distribute vast quantities of pictorial material—extending those services even to the villages. They have studied—as had their predecessors—various plans and proposals for either simplifying the Chinese language or romanizing it or both; but they have not thus far put into effect any of these.

Of "Art", Chairman Mao Tse-tung has declared: "There is no such thing as art for art's sake"; all work should "serve the interests of the workers, peasants and soldiers." So—Art, in all its forms, is made to conform to official concepts and to serve the purposes of the State. In that framework, authors and artists glorify the laboring man, feature the Communist struggle for peace, and with one accord anathematize the United States.

In all the fields they have endeavored to eliminate Western influence, except that of the Soviet Union. They have made the experience, the practices, the theories and the products of the Soviet Union their patterns and guides. They have emphasized conformity. They have engineered "anti" campaigns and "remodelling" movements, with processes of mob trial, of self criticism and of confession. They have used everywhere the procedures of spying, informing, accusing, condemning and penalizing. They have compelled the people—especially the intellectuals—to abase themselves and to denounce one another. And these things they continue to do.

They staged in 1957 a "Rectification Campaign", directed toward liquidation or suppression of critics of the regime. Mao Tse-tung had in February expressed himself in terms of a classic: "Let the hundred flowers

bloom." The government had later invited criticism. There had ensued a month in which many intellectuals and many student groups indulged fervently in freedom of speech. And then the regime clamped down, in terms of "weeding the garden" or "suppression" of "rightists." Sad has been the fate, the brainwashing and orthodoxying, of many of the men—and some women—who in this context had expressed themselves in words disagreeable to the regime.

The very latest manifestation of the regime's will to dictate is being afforded in the so-called "relocation movement." Announcement was made last November that several hundred thousand students and likewise large numbers of government employees, urban workers, professional men and intellectuals were "volunteering" to go forth, settle in rural areas, and serve the cause of agriculture. "Volunteering" was, of course, a euphonious rendering of "being sent"—just as it had been in relation to the soldiers sent by Peking into Korea in and after 1950.

Thus has Communism, authoritarian totalitarianism, dealt with the people in mainland China. A few Communist leaders and some millions of Communist Party members, a "People's Government", dispose as they see fit of the lives and property of 500,000,000 people, their *subjects*.

Among their purposes, the Communist leaders have of course had that of making China prosperous and powerful.

In the economic field, on the constructive side, they have proceeded with a program modeled upon that devised and already far advanced in the Soviet Union. The objectives and methods have been: agricultural reorganization and improvement; industrial rehabilitation and expansion; enlargement and improvement of communications; exploitation of mineral resources; and collectivization.

Toward implementing its program the regime launched in 1953 a Five Year Plan. That Plan is understood to have been prepared by Soviet experts. It called among other things for doubling the gross industrial output. Its techniques have been Soviet in concept and in form. The means for proceeding with it—including financing, equipment and instruction—have come largely from the Soviet Union. Remainders from it are now being carried forward in a second Five Year Plan.

In what it has done with the programs thus far, the regime has greatly improved the physical face of the country. It has emphasized the interests of the state rather than the betterment of the lot of its people. Incidentally, yet pertinently, it has employed on projects directed toward agricultural improvement millions of men, women and children recruited in large part from the peasantry, and more millions


from the slave labor. In the realms of industrial expansion, of improvement of communications, and of exploitation of mineral wealth, it has added substantially to the state's capabilities.

The most venturesome of the politico-economic undertakings has been and is that of the agricultural collectivization. This has called for organizing of co-operatives within the Chinese farming pattern and for creation of large mechanized farms in areas where that is practicable. It has been implemented widely and at a fast pace. It gives rise to, and it still leaves open a question: whether the regime can deal successfully with the human factor, can cause several hundred million peasants to cooperate in an undertaking which calls for abandonment of their traditional aspiration to land ownership and of their accustomed manner of tilling each his little plot of ground. To reconcile the peasants to this it will have to be shown them as individuals that they profit by it. Otherwise, each can offer resistance—at least in its passive form.

There has been from the outset some forceful resistance, in some places, to some of the regime's efforts. There is disagreement as to its character and extent. The Communists themselves have reported from time to time on "liquidation" of "subversive armed forces," in terms invariably of not less than "tens of thousands." Those reports signify only that there is some overt resistance and that where it occurs it is stamped out. That there can be much—in the absence of leaders, of organization and of weapons—is not likely. Mass suffering and popular resentment do not of themselves produce formidable revolt.

There could develop a conflict within the Party. There could come disaffection within the armed forces. There might occur the long planned assault from Formosa. In the event of any one or more of such conceivable developments there might ensue a widespread popular rebellion. There is, however, no indication that any of these is imminently likely.

Probably greatest among Communist China's internal problems is that of food for its already huge and fast increasing population. China has more land than is now under cultivation but it also has too many people in and clinging to the most favorable areas, and the trend of population movement recently has been from the land to the cities rather than the reverse. The regime is working on that problem. It is, with engineering, selection of crops, etc., bringing hitherto uncultivated or long neglected areas into production. It has destroyed many grave sites and cemeteries. The population, though, is increasing at a rate which outruns that of the processes of reclamation. The answer would be: slow down the birth rate and speed up the agriculture. Birth control,



though, while much talked about, is not sweeping the country.

In the realm of mineral resources, China is in terms of *absolute* amounts reasonably well endowed, but in terms of *relative* amounts and of advantageous juxtapositions is less well off than are several other countries. What she is known to have is enough to support an extensive but not a "super" industrialization.

In the realm of foreign trade, there has been and is in some quarters much wishful talking about the possibilities of China as a market. If one looks at figures of world trade, historical and actual, one finds that the China market never has amounted to really much. Nor is it likely to in the near future. China has not much to export, and, therefore, not much with which to pay for imports. There may come a time when she will have the wherewithal—but that time is probably a long way off. Currently, what the Communist regime most wants from abroad is strategic goods; what it gives most of in return is raw materials and food stuffs; and most of what trading it does is with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.

Communist China's armed forces—ground and air—are the foundation and guarantors of the regime's authority. They add up to a large establishment. Organized on the Soviet model and with Soviet assistance, they draw heavily upon Russian sources for equipment.

Outstanding is the abiding fact that the Communist regime in the Soviet Union has supplied the inspiration, the pattern, the guidance and much of the equipment and funds that have made possible *first* the existence, *second* the victory, and *third* the thus-

far-successful post-victory functioning of (a) the Communist Party in China and (b) the regime which now is implementing that Party's purposes and plans.

Whether Communist China now is a satellite or is a partner of the Soviet Union is a question of no very great importance. The two are allies. Communist China is in many respects dependent on the Soviet Union; the Soviet Union has in turn need of and uses for Communist China's assets; and the leaders in the two countries have in common several portentous objectives. For the present, those leaders cause the Bear and the Dragon to lie down together, lie abroad together, stand together, forage together, and profit together, in a climate of—for them—convenient and advantageous "coexistence." They could—some day—quarrel and go apart; but not now.

Together, they are encouraging the Peking Government to essay a role in world affairs utterly unfamiliar in modern times to the Chinese state, that of an affirmative heavy-weight contender. In this, some features of the foreign policy, the strategy and the tactics of China's Communist leaders are obvious: Among these are: acceptance of Soviet leadership; support of positions taken internationally by the Soviet Government; effort to make secure the newly re-established Chinese imperial domain; effort to achieve for that domain a great power status, with universal diplomatic recognition of its Government and occupation by that government of China's seats in the United Nations; and, in general, effort to enlarge the influence of the Communist bloc.

What plans the Peking authorities may have, if any, for forceful external adventuring they alone know. They are emphasizing preparedness. They are expressing opinions and giving advice abroad—in support of Soviet opinions, advice or action. They presumably will be guided by their and Moscow's reading of developments and opportunities in the "cold" war. Meanwhile, they propagate at home and abroad the thought that China is again a great power, that it must "liberate" Formosa, and that it must and will defy the United States.

However, it seems reasonable to believe that for the present the regime is fully preoccupied with its program and its problems at home.

It is *not true* that "all is well along the Yangtze." It is *not true* that in mainland China's cities "there no longer are flies." It is *not true* that the people have enough to eat and enough to wear and are happy. Qualified observers note with one accord that the programmers and implementers are now encountering grim realities in terms of shortages. One such who, having known the old China, has travelled extensively in the new, remarks nostalgically that in the new—he hears no laughter and he seldom

glimpses a smile. Reports currently (in February 1958) being made in Peking by officials of the regime show clearly that there has been and is widespread discontent.

The regime is certainly in no position now to continue the pace at which it thus far has exploited the people and the land in the interests of the Party, the Government and the State. Nor are the mood of the people, the capabilities of the Land, and the relations between those who govern and those who are governed such as would warrant pursuit by Communist China of a foreign policy involving a risk of war with a power capable of bombing its industrial and military concentrations and blockading its ports. The regime can, however, and does make trouble for and among its neighbors and in the forum of world affairs.

The victory of the Communist Party in China in 1949 and the jurisdictional dichotomy which ensued gave rise to many problems in the relations of other countries with China. All other Communist states and several not-Communist states promptly transferred their diplomatic recognition from the National Government to the newly created Communist Government in Peking. As of today, the United States and with it a majority of other countries still abide by the recognition accorded over the years since 1928 to the National Government.

On several occasions, once very recently (in January 1958), this country's Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, has declared that it is the policy of the United States in this context: to continue our recognition and support of the National Government; to continue our withholding of diplomatic recognition of the Communist "People's Government"; and to continue our opposing of admission of the latter to the United Nations. (Mr. Dulles also has explained why, has shown that we do not ignore Communist China, and has added to the effect that "no" does not necessarily mean "never.")

That policy takes appropriate account of the record and the attitude of the National Government and it shows respect for our obligation and our commitment to that Government. It takes account likewise of the record and the attitude of the Communist regime on the mainland. It is in line with the over-all purposes and efforts of American foreign policy in defense and promotion of freedom, peace, security and justice.

The Communist Government in Peking follows the lead of the Soviet Government in Moscow in the war which the Communist world is making upon the free world. They two work hand in hand toward victory for "Communism" throughout the world. They make use of a great variety of weapons and,

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with many methods, press their attack on many fronts. They demand concessions but they make no concessions. They talk of "peaceful co-existence"—but those words do not mean to them what they mean to us. Nor does "Communism" mean "communism": it is simply a name, the name of a system devised and employed toward enslavement and exploitation of the many by a few.

The United States is the world's most powerful and most committed champion of freedom. In defense of freedom—our own and that of other peoples—it is simple common sense that we be prepared

and be determined to use many weapons and many methods, both positive and negative. Surely we should not give militant Communism aid and comfort. Surely we should refrain from any action implying that we assent to its purposes and efforts to consolidate and extend its gains. Surely we should not accommodate it at the expense of any of our allies. Surely we should make difficulties for it. Surely we must be prepared to counter with effective force if, when and wherever it resorts to use of force against any free people. And we must make clear to it and to all concerned that we can be relied upon.

This article, "Communism at work in
China," has been reprinted in the
Congressional Record of Wednesday, April
23, 1958, at pp. 6244-6246.

Yours truly,
John C. G.

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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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